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A resolvable frozen conflict? Designing a 
Settlement for Transnistria 
The conflict over Transnistria is a territorial dispute in which one of the conflict parties 
(Transnistria) seeks independence while the other (Moldova) aims to restore its full 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. For close to two decades, the situation has been 
stagnant: a ceasefire agreement signed in 1992 in Moscow between the Russian and 
Moldovan presidents at the time—Yeltsin and Snegur—established a trilateral peacekeeping 
mission (Russia, Moldova, Transnistria) and a buffer zone along the Dniestr/Nistru River. 
Protected by these arrangements and an additional Russian military presence, Transnistria 
has developed into a de-facto state of its own, albeit without international recognition and 
heavily dependent on Russia. 
 
Stefan Wolff, November 2011 
ECMI Issue Brief #26 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The OSCE, as the leading international 
organisation involved, has been engaged since 
almost immediately after a cease-fire was 
achieved in 1992, with the current mission 
established in February 1993 and opening 
offices in Chisinau in April the same year and in 
Transnistria two years later. The negotiation 
format is such that the OSCE, Ukraine and 
Russia act as co-mediators for the (on and off) 
negotiations between Transnistria and Moldova, 
while the US and the EU joined this process in 
2005 as observers. Multiple proposals for a 
settlement of the conflict have yet to lead to 
tangible progress towards a settlement. 
However, over the past two years, there have 
been some concrete signs that external pressure 
for a settlement is increasing. By mid-November 
2010, five meetings between the parties in the 
5+2 format had taken place since the beginning 
of the year, and consensus had been achieved to 
take stock of previously signed agreements and 
begin work on elaborating a system of 
guarantees for a future settlement. Also during 
2010, tangible progress to improve relations 
between the parties had been made, including in 
the areas of railway transportation (re-opening 
of the Chisinau-Tiraspol-Odessa line), export 
procedures (especially for products of 
Transnistria-based companies via Moldova), 
movement of goods (across the Nistru and in 
both directions), and restoration of landline 
telephone communication between Moldova and 
Transnistria. At the same time, a the German-
Russian Meseberg initiative to reinvigorate 
actual negotiations remains current, its latest off-
shoot being a German ‘non-paper’ presented to 
the parties at the informal 5+2 talks in Moscow 
in June 2011. A two-day ‘Review Conference on 
Confidence-building Measures in the 
Transdniestria Settlement Process’ took place at 
the George C. Marshall European Center for 
Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 
Germany, on 9 and 10 November 2010, to assess 
progress in relation to confidence building and 
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discuss ways to intensify the engagement 
between the parties in existing working groups. 
Another high-level OSCE conference took place 
in early September 2011 in Bad Reichenhall, 
followed by a meeting between Moldovan Prime 
Minister Vlad Filat and Transnistrian President 
Igor Smirnov, and the first gathering of a 
Conflict Resolution Taskforce on Moldova co-
sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation. 
While there is gradually some more 
focus on the content of a potential conflict 
settlement, overwhelmingly among the 5+2 the 
main concern is with the process of a settlement, 
and specifically with a resumption of official 
negotiations. Even if these were to re-start soon, 
they would not in and of themselves constitute 
actual progress toward a settlement, as major 
impediments remain. The main obstacles at 
present are the political instability in Moldova, 
including within the governing coalition and 
upcoming presidential elections in Transnistria 
and Russia. The uncertainty deriving from these 
will most likely give way to greater clarity over 
the next 12 to 18 months, a period that is crucial 
to prepare all sides for substantive and 
eventually conclusive negotiations. With this in 
mind, the following observations are meant to 
contribute to developing concrete proposals for a 
conflict settlement for Transnistria. Following a 
brief overview of the core issues around which 
the conflict has evolved, I analyse a range of 
existing proposals that reflect the Moldovan, 
Russian/Transnistrian, and Mediators’ positions 
to date. On that basis, I suggest a framework in 
which these proposals, and the relative 
consensus they exhibit, can be accommodated. 
 
II.   BACKGROUND: CONFLICT 
ISSUES IN TRANSNISTRIA 
In its core parameters, the conflict over 
Transnistria is not unique, and similar conflicts 
have been resolved successfully in the past. This 
experience suggests that any attempt to break the 
continuing deadlock and move toward a 
sustainable settlement short of recognising 
Transnistria’s independence has to provide a 
framework to determine the relationship 
between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova. 
Such a framework needs to account for the 
territorial status of Transnistria within Moldova 
(also bearing in mind the status of the existing 
Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit and 
possibly the status of the city of Bender, 
currently located in the security zone), the 
distribution of powers between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol, and the degree to which to which the 
two sides share power at the centre. In order to 
ensure that any agreements are implemented and 
subsequently operated fully and in good faith, it 
will be essential to incorporate dispute 
resolution mechanisms into a settlement. The 
two key issues internationally that need to be 
addressed in the negotiation process are the 
Russian dimension of the conflict (the current 
and future presence of foreign troops and 
Moldovan demilitarization and neutrality) and 
the Romanian dimension (the possibility of 
unification with Romania). Any agreements 
achieved will require strong and viable 
guarantees in domestic and international law. 
These dimensions are relatively 
undisputed between the parties (Moldova and 
Transnistria) and the mediators (OSCE, Russia, 
Ukraine). Yet, there have not been any formal 
negotiations on a settlement of the conflict for 
nearly half a decade. The so-called 5+2 
negotiations (conflict parties, mediators, plus EU 
and US as observers) are only held on an 
informal basis at present despite growing 
international pressure for a resumption of formal 
talks has been building up considerably since the 
Meseberg Memorandum of June 2010. At the 
last informal 5+2 talks in Moscow in June 2011, 
the resumption of formal talks was impossible 
because the Transnistrian delegation did not 
have a formal negotiation mandate. At same 
time, however, a German ‘non-paper’, circulated 
among the 5+2 before the Moscow meeting and 
not publically available, was the first concrete 
proposal injected into the talks on a variety of 
status issues since the 2005 Ukrainian Plan. 
After years of focus on the settlement process, 
this has signalled a new sincerity internationally 
to move towards substantive negotiations. 
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III.   A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF PAST SETTLEMENT 
PROPOSALS 
Past settlement proposals for Transnistria 
broadly fall into two broad categories: those that 
are concerned with how to get to a settlement 
and those that are aimed at the what of the actual 
settlement provisions. It is the latter set of 
proposals that I shall focus on: ‘Report No. 13 of 
the CSCE Mission to Moldova’ (1993), the 
‘Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic 
Principles of the State Structure of a United 
State in Moldova’ (2003, the Kozak 
Memorandum), the ‘Proposals and 
Recommendations of the Mediators from the 
OSCE, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine 
with regard to the Transdniestrian Settlement’ 
(2004), and the ‘Plan for the Settlement of the 
Transdniestrian Problem’ (2005, the 
Yushchenko or Poroshenko Plan). As required 
by the 2005 Ukrainian Plan, the Parliament of 
Moldova passed a law ‘On Fundamental 
Regulations of the Special Legal Status of 
Settlements on the Left Bank of the River Nistru 
(Transnistria)’ on 22 July 2005. More recent 
Moldovan thinking is captured in a 2007 
package proposal for a ‘Declaration concerning 
principles and guarantees of the Transnistrian 
settlement’ and, appended to it, a ‘Draft Law on 
the Special Legal Status of Transnistria’. Table 1 
summarises the content of the existing 
proposals. 
 
IV.   THE WAY FORWARD: 
ELEMENTS OF A SUSTAINABLE 
SETTLEMENT 
The existing proposals for the settlement of the 
Transnistrian offer a wide range of different 
mechanisms to address the multiple and 
complex problems involved. Despite obvious 
differences, principal consensus exists in a 
number of areas and provides the foundation for 
offering a set of options consistent with the 
existing consensus. 
Territorial Status 
There is considerable agreement across the 
existing proposals that the Transnistrian conflict 
requires some sort of territorial self-government 
as part of the political-institutional arrangements 
to be set up by a settlement. None of the 
proposals excludes such an option to be 
extended also to other areas in Moldova, notably 
Gagauzia (where it has existed since 1995) and 
Bender. Given the different local and local-
centre dynamics in each of the three areas, in 
combination with the general reluctance on the 
part of Chisinau to federalise the country as a 
whole, a multiple asymmetric federacy 
arrangement would seem the most appropriate 
form of territorial state construction. This would 
have several advantages: first, the existing 
arrangement with Gagauzia could remain 
untouched; second, Chisinau and Tiraspol could 
directly negotiate the substance of Transnistria’s 
settlement (e.g., as foreseen in the various past 
proposals); and third, the remainder of the 
territory of Moldova would remain largely 
unaffected in terms of existing governance 
structures. Such arrangements are not 
uncommon: devolution in the United Kingdom 
(although not properly a federacy arrangement 
because of a lack of constitutional 
entrenchment), the arrangements for Greenland 
and the Faroer Isles in Denmark, the five regions 
with a special autonomy statutes in Italy, and the 
autonomous communities in Spain all serve as 
relatively successful examples. 
The distribution of powers 
All existing proposals recognise the importance 
of distributing powers clearly between Chisinau 
and Tiraspol, but differ in the level of detail and 
nature of their approach. Especially in post-
conflict settings, it is potentially problematic to 
operate with exclusive and joint competences in 
the way in which the CSCE Report, the Kozak 
Memorandum, and the Mediator Proposals do. 
Rather than having two lists of exclusive 
competences, a multiple asymmetric federacy 
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arrangement lends itself more to clearly defining 
the competences of the federated entities (which 
could be different for Tiraspol compared to 
Komrat and/or Bender) while leaving all others 
(i.e., anything not specifically assigned to an 
entity), and thus residual authority, to the centre. 
At the same time, it would not preclude 
mentioning a few specific competences for the 
centre (such as defence, fiscal and currency 
policy, citizenship) as long as this is understood 
as an open-ended list including all but those 
powers specifically assigned to an entity. This is 
the pattern of distributing powers in a number of 
comparable cases, including Belgium (e.g., 
Brussels), Italy (e.g., South Tyrol) and Ukraine 
(Crimea). In Moldova itself, this model currently 
applies to Gagauzia. 
It is also worthwhile considering the notions of 
primary and secondary legislative competences, 
implicitly reflected in the 2004 Mediator 
Proposals. This distinction has its source in the 
legal boundaries to which they are confined. 
Primary legislative competences (i.e., the areas 
in which Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender enjoys 
exclusive powers) would then only have 
constraints in the Moldovan constitution and the 
country’s international obligations. Secondary 
legislation, that is legislation in areas of 
potentially concurrent/joint/shared competences, 
would be constrained by framework legislation 
in which Chisinau determines the basic 
principles of legislation while the federated 
entities make the detailed arrangements as they 
are to apply in their territories. As there are 
normally also provisions for additional delegated 
powers (i.e., areas in which the centre has 
exclusive legislative competence but delegates 
this to the entity), the notion of tertiary 
legislative competence might be useful 
constraining local legislation in two ways. First, 
it is only in specifically ‘delegated’ policy areas 
beyond the stipulations of a constitutional or 
other legal arrangement defining entity 
competences in which such competence could 
be exercised. Second, entity legislation would 
have to comply with a range of particular 
constraints specified in individual cases of 
delegated legislative competence, as well as with 
the more general constraints imposed on primary 
and secondary competences. 
Power Sharing  
Power-sharing arrangements can be established 
qua representation and participation rules across 
the three branches of government (executive, 
legislature, judiciary) and the civil service.  
Executive power sharing is often seen as 
central among power-sharing arrangements and 
taken to include representation in the executive, 
in this case of representatives of the territorial 
entities concerned (i.e., 
Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender). Representation 
of particular segments of society, including 
those defined on the basis of territory, can be 
achieved in different ways. Most relevant for the 
proposed multiple asymmetric federacy would 
be through a formal arrangement that makes the 
heads of the federated executives members of 
the central cabinet (and has a similar 
requirement for line ministries). Moldova 
already has experience with this mechanism in 
relation to Gagauzia. It would guarantee a 
minimum of representation without the need for 
unwieldy, overblown executives, and it would 
serve as one mechanism for policy coordination 
(see below). In line with the Kozak 
Memorandum, heads of federated executives 
could be given deputy prime ministerial 
positions, and meaningful representation of the 
federated entities at the centre could be further 
increased by creating a special ministry (or 
ministries or ministerial offices) to deal with 
affairs of the entities (similar to the UK 
Secretaries of State for Scotland/Wales/Northern 
Ireland or the Minister for London between 1994 
and 2010). 
As far as legislative power sharing goes, 
a multiple asymmetric federacy arrangement 
would not require a bicameral system as 
foreseen in the Kozak Memorandum or the 
Mediator Proposals. Representation of the 
entities can be ensured through the choice of an 
electoral system that results in proportional 
outcomes. In the case of Moldova, because of 
the proposed territorial state construction, open 
or closed List-PR in a single state-wide 
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constituency (possibly with threshold 
exemptions for regional parties), plurality 
single-member (e.g., ‘first-past-the-post’ or 
Alternative Vote) or preferential multi-member 
constituencies (e.g., Single Transferable Vote) 
would all result in reasonably proportional 
outcomes.  
In terms of the effective participation 
dimension of power sharing, the parties could 
agree the use of qualified and/or concurrent 
majorities for parliamentary decisions in specific 
areas (either pre-determined or triggered 
according to a particular procedure), thus 
establishing a limited veto power for territorial 
entities even in the absence of an upper house. 
Such an arrangement, however, would also 
require that members of parliament ‘designate’ 
themselves as representing a particular territorial 
entity (i.e., Transnistria/Gagauzia/Bender).  
Judicial power sharing could be assured 
through mandatory representation of judges 
nominated by the legislative bodies of the 
federated entities in the highest courts, 
especially the constitutional court and/or the 
supreme court. In each of the entities, a regional 
branch of these courts could be established, 
serving as highest-instance court for matters 
pertaining to the legislative framework of the 
entity in question, while still being part of the 
unified judicial system of Moldova. Similar to 
the proposals in the Kozak Memorandum, a 
transitional period could require qualified 
majorities for decisions to be adopted in the 
Constitutional Court. 
In order to strengthen links between the 
centre and the federated entities, giving the latter 
a stake also in the political process of Moldova 
as a whole, proportional representation, 
including at senior levels, could be required for 
the civil service. For a transitional period, this 
could also include differential recruitment in 
order to overcome historically grown 
imbalances.  
Policy coordination and dispute 
resolution  
The existing proposals are relatively silent on 
this important dimension of sustainable conflict 
settlement, yet to the extent that there is 
consensus it extends to two particular areas. 
First, there is a recognised need for judicial 
review and arbitration, including considering the 
constitutionality of legislation for the 
implementation of existing agreements and 
potentially involving the Constitutional Court as 
ultimate arbiter. While it is clearly important to 
have procedures judicial review and arbitration 
in place, other mechanisms might be useful to 
prevent recourse to such ultimate mechanisms. 
This is another area where some, at least 
implicit, consensus exists in the form of 
establishing specific conciliation mechanisms to 
deal with the interpretation and implementation 
of a settlement agreement.  
In addition to conciliation mechanisms, 
which are normally invoked after a difference 
cannot be resolved in another way (but before 
taking the matter to a court), joint committees 
and implementation bodies could be established 
to find common interpretations for specific 
aspects of agreements and regulations and to 
coordinate the implementation of specific 
policies at national and regional levels, including 
the joint drafting of implementation legislation.  
Co-optation is another useful mechanism for 
policy coordination, ensuring that the ‘special 
circumstances’ of each of the federated entities 
would be  borne in mind in the process of 
national law and policy-making. In addition, the 
Crimean example, with a Representative Office 
of the President of Ukraine which acts, in part, 
as a coordination mechanism with oversight, but 
no executive powers, is worthwhile considering. 
A further, or alternative, mechanism that might 
prove useful is the establishment of specific 
ministries or ministerial offices dealing with 
entity affairs at the centre, implicitly reflected in 
the Mediator Proposals.  
The Russian and Romanian 
dimensions 
How to deal with the questions of 
demilitarization, neutrality and the presence of 
foreign troops could be the most decisive issue 
to determine whether a negotiated settlement for 
Transnistria will be possible. It will require an 
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international agreement, rather than merely an 
arrangement between Chisinau and Tiraspol. At 
the same time, it could also be an area where a 
‘grand bargain’ among all the parties involved 
can be achieved, linking these three issues to 
those of the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of Moldova, thus including interlocking 
protections for all sides involved.  
As a model for such an arrangement, the 
1991 ‘Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, 
Independence, Territorial Integrity and 
Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of 
Cambodia’ should be considered. Here, the 
nineteen states participating in the Paris 
Conference on Cambodia signed, among others, 
this agreement in which Cambodia committed 
itself to a wide range of principles for its future 
domestic and international conduct, including to 
‘maintain, preserve and defend its sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and 
inviolability, neutrality, and national unity’, to 
entrench its ‘perpetual neutrality ... in the ... 
constitution’,  ‘refrain from entering into any 
military alliances or other military agreements 
with other States that would be inconsistent with 
its neutrality’, and ‘refrain from permitting the 
introduction or stationing of foreign forces, 
including military personnel, in any form 
whatsoever, in Cambodia, and to prevent the 
establishment or maintenance of foreign military 
bases’. In return, the other signatory states 
undertook ‘to recognize and to respect in every 
way the sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity and inviolability, neutrality and 
national unity of Cambodia.’ 
While the situation in Cambodia in, and prior to, 
1991 was clearly different from that in Moldova, 
this Agreement is highly relevant as it addresses 
the core issues of both the Russian and 
Romanian dimensions of the conflict, while at 
the same time providing an international anchor 
for Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Under such an arrangement, Moldova 
would gain a Russian commitment to its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange 
for agreeing not to join NATO.  
Similar to what already exists in the 
settlement for Gagauzia and has been widely 
accepted in relation to Transnistria, the latter 
should have an option of seceding from 
Moldova in case of unification with Romania.  
Guarantee mechanisms 
Three different types of guarantees, reflected to 
some extent across all existing proposals, are 
relevant for a future settlement of the 
Trannsistrian conflict. First, in/formal, legally 
non-binding arrangements for a whole 
settlement or specific provisions that detail how 
parties envisage operation and implementation 
of settlement provisions. For example, the 
parties should agree a range of principles that 
determine their mutual conduct in terms of 
coordinating legislation and policy. This could 
include the creation of consultation bodies and a 
determination of their working procedures. 
Another option might be to make the currently 
existing Working Groups permanent or extend 
their existence into a transitional period, both 
with appropriately amended mandates and terms 
of reference. 
 Second, the different federated entities 
will all require status entrenchment in legislation 
and the constitution. This has already been 
accomplished for the status of Gagauzia: a 
constitutional anchoring of the status of 
Gagauzia as a special entity in Moldova 
(currently Article 111 of the constitution) and an 
organic law (dating back to 1995) that specifies, 
among other things, the competences of 
Gagauzia. This could be applied to settlements 
for Transnistria and possibly Bender. At present, 
changes to his law require a three-fifths majority 
in parliament. This could be strengthened, in line 
with suggestions in the Kozak Memorandum 
and the Mediator Proposals, by requiring the 
consent of the parliament of the respective entity 
for any changes to its status or competences. 
Third, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ international guarantees 
will be useful not only to entrench any 
settlement internationally but also commit 
external parties to a settlement. This could take 
two forms in the case of the Transnistrian 
conflict. On the one hand, achieving a settlement 
in the current 5+2 format would involve Ukraine 
and Russia as guarantor states, with OSCE as the 
lead mediator and the US and EU as observers. 
 ECMI- Issue Brief  
 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
This is clearly foreseen in a number of past 
proposals. In addition, a bilateral (Moldova-
Russia) or multilateral treaty (involving all states 
parties involved in the 5+2 format), along the 
lines of the 1991 Cambodia Agreement referred 
to above could prove useful and effective in 
assuring the parties. 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
While the case of the Transnistrian conflict in 
Moldova has many distinct features, it is not 
wholly unique among contemporary intra-state 
territorial disputes. Many of these involve 
similar territorial disputes and have implications 
beyond the immediate locality of the conflict, 
including external powers with significant stakes 
in the outcome. On the basis of an analysis of 
existing proposals for the settlement of the 
conflict over Transnistria, a multiple asymmetric 
federacy arrangement negotiated within the 
current 5+2 format of talks and entrenched in 
domestic legislation and the constitution and in a 
multilateral international treaty seems a 
reasonable framework within which the conflict 
parties might agree a permanent set of 
institutions that fully restores Moldovan 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ultimately, 
however, it is up to the parties and the mediators 
to decide how sincere they are in moving 
forward to a sustainable settlement. 
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Table 1: A Comparative Summary of Provisions in Past Settlement Proposals for the Transnistrian Conflict 
 Territorial 
Status 
Distribution of 
Powers 
Power Sharing 
Policy Coordination/Dispute 
Settlement 
Russian 
Dimension 
Romanian 
Dimension 
Guarantees 
C
SC
E 
R
ep
o
rt
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
 Special status 
for 
Transnistria, 
possibly for 
Bender and 
Gagauzia, 
possibly 
regionalised 
state 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail 
 
 Proportional representation 
for Transnistria in 
parliament, top courts and 
key ministries 
  Complete 
demilitarization
; 
 Russian 
withdrawal 
 Option for 
Transnistri
an 
Secession 
 International guarantees, 
especially CSCE mediation of a 
agreement 
K
o
za
k 
M
em
o
ra
n
d
u
m
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
 Two federacy 
arrangements
: Moldova-
Transnistria 
and Moldova-
Gagauzia 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail; 
 Residual 
authority with 
federal 
subjects 
 Pre-determined number of 
seats for Transnistria and 
Gagauzia in Constitutional 
Court and Senate; 
 Qualified majorities in 
Senate and Constitutional 
Court during transition 
period 
 Consultation on international 
treaties affecting joint 
competences 
 Moldova as a 
neutral, 
demilitarized 
state 
 Option for 
Transnistri
an 
Secession 
 Constitutional entrenchment 
of status, combined with 
qualified majorities necessary 
for constitutional 
amendments  
M
ed
ia
to
r 
P
ro
p
o
sa
ls
 (
2
0
0
4
) 
 Federal State 
with 
Transnistria 
as a federal 
subject 
 Exclusive and 
joint 
competences 
listed in detail; 
 Residual 
authority with 
federal 
subjects 
 Two-thirds majority in both 
houses of parliament for 
constitutional laws 
 Federal state institutions to 
effect policy coordination; 
 Disagreements over 
competences to be arbitrated 
by Constitutional Court; 
 Disagreements over 
implementation to be 
resolved in existing 
negotiation format or 
separate conciliation 
mechanism 
 Reduction of 
military 
capacity up to 
demilitarization 
 Option for 
Transnistri
an 
Secession 
 Integrated system of 
international, domestic, 
economic, military and 
political guarantees, including 
enforcement mechanisms 
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U
kr
ai
n
ia
n
 P
la
n
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
 Special status 
for 
Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
organic special-
status law 
 Joint drafting of special-
status law  
 Conciliation Committee with 
international participation to 
resolve disputes over 
compliance with/ 
interpretation of special-
status law 
  Option for 
Transnistri
an 
Secession 
 Domestic legal and 
multilateral international 
guarantees; 
 Guarantor states and OSCE 
entitled to further 
international legal steps in 
case of non-compliance 
M
o
ld
o
va
n
 
Fr
am
ew
o
rk
 L
aw
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
 Special status 
for 
Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
organic special-
status law 
 Joint drafting of special-
status law 
  Transnistrian 
demilitarization 
and Russian 
withdrawal as 
preconditions 
for settlement 
  A system of internal 
guarantees to accompany the 
special-status law 
M
o
ld
o
va
n
 P
ac
ka
ge
 P
ro
p
o
sa
ls
  
(2
0
0
7
) 
 Special status 
for 
Transnistria 
 Division of 
powers to be 
established in 
special-status 
law 
 Joint drafting of special-
status law 
 Proportional representation 
for Transnistria in 
parliament 
 Representation in 
government, Constitutional 
and Supreme Courts, 
Security Council, 
Prosecutor-General’s Office 
and Interior Ministry 
 Disagreements over 
competences to be arbitrated 
by Constitutional Court 
 Moldova as a 
neutral, non-
aligned state 
 Russian 
withdrawal 
 No foreign 
military bases 
or facilities in 
Moldova 
 Option for 
Transnistri
an 
Secession 
 A system of internal legal, 
political and economic 
guarantees 
 International mission under 
OSCE mandate to monitor 
demilitarisation and creation 
of joint armed forces 
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